American Academe in the Early Twentieth Century

PARADIGMS OLD AND NEW

Reflecting back upon American higher education as he had experienced it in the early years of the 1900s, Henry Seidel Canby (Alma Mater, 1936) recalled it as a period of relative calm and tranquility underlain by a certain ambiguity of purpose. "Particularly in the first decade of the new century," he reported, "they were trying in our college to combine various incompatibles. . . . A young instructor on the faculty in, say 1905, could look upon this unheard of combination of sporting resort, beer garden, political convention, laboratory, and factory for research with a mind as confused as a Spanish omelet." But Canby's sense of incompatibility seems not to have been widely shared, judging from the tone of the many writings on higher learning that appeared in scholarly and popular journals of the day. As compared with the deep divisions of opinion and sharply contrasting views vented in books and journals in the 1870s and 1880s, the overall climate was more nearly one of consensus and accommodation.

Discussions of academic ideals and goals at the turn of the century seemed markedly less polemical, more restrained, more inclined to point to areas of agreement than formerly. Statements of academic purpose became hazier, less
distinct, more temperate in their expression. The mood now seemed to be one of incorporating every desirable goal within a common institutional framework. Thus, commentators tended to speak in generalities about the value of a college education: about how it afforded contact with a cultural legacy, fostered exemplary habits of self-discipline and restraint, and promoted professional skill and competency. The social prestige and financial worth of holding a college degree now came into more attention than the actual content of the learning associated with it.

It is difficult not to detect in early-twentieth-century literature on higher learning a desire on the part of the larger universities to be all things to all people, to offer everyone something of advantage. “I do not believe,” observed President Harry Pratt Judson of the University of Chicago in 1907, “that the college should aim at any one kind of product. There should be diversity of results as there is a diversity of natural traits. No college should aim to put its hallmark upon all men in such a sense as to expect that all will be substantially alike.” As a professor of Greek at Columbia interpreted them in 1907, the basic purposes of a university were multiple: to preserve and transmit liberal culture; to share useful knowledge with the populace at large; to serve as an agent of beneficial social change in a burgeoning industrial and commercial order; and to serve as a center for disinterested inquiry and the production of new knowledge through research and scholarly writing. “We may seek at times . . . to separate these notions,” he observed, “but they are really so interwoven in the complete idea of a university that no clear boundary lines can be drawn between them. Least of all should the thought of opposition between them enter our minds.”

That apparent felt lack of tension among dissimilar academic goals, it might be argued, reflected the emergent hegemony of the research university as an ideal institutional type in American higher education. What seemed abundantly clear was that the model or paradigm prevailing at the opening of the twentieth century differed markedly from the old ideal that had held sway approximately a half century before. If the old-time college typically was defined by teaching and a fixed curriculum still dominated by classical languages and literature, the new university defined itself in terms of research and a bewildering array of modern utilitarian programs of study. If the old college tended to be paternalistic and intimately involved in the lives of its students, the new university was inclined to be more impersonal, more permissive, less directly engaged in student supervision. Above all, as the old college was small, the university was large. So predominant had the modern university model become, sanctioning as it did a monolithic set of institutional standards and priorities, it seemingly left little room for alternatives. The primacy of the university was such that other types of institutions could only seek to imitate its essential features or risk being left hopelessly behind. In effect, higher education in America formed a pyramid, with the values of research universities dominating the structure at its pinnacle.

Most private liberal-arts colleges lacked the resources needed to transform themselves into institutions dedicated more to generating knowledge than simply to transmitting it. Unable or unwilling to compete directly with universities in offering specialized professional training, many colleges set about the task of redefining themselves exclusively as teaching institutions. Their basic role would be to serve as purveyors of liberal culture. Faced with the choice of emulating universities or remaining something quite different, even if it meant a certain loss of popular support, colleges ultimately opted for the latter. Special-purpose or regional institutions, in contrast, rather quickly succumbed to the research-dominated model and sought to acquire the trappings of a full-fledged university as quickly as possible.

The development of the normal school as an institution dedicated to teacher preparation affords a prime example. Teaching seminaries and normal schools had long concentrated their efforts on the training of classroom practitioners for the lower schools. Successive name changes over time pointed to their evolution in an entirely new direction, however. Thus, the “normal school” of the 1890s, which up until then had been little more than a glorified high school, became the “state teachers’ college” of the teens and twenties. A few decades later, it had become the “state college.” Eventually, much expanded, it took pride in being the “state university.” Directly reflective of the premium placed upon “doing research” associated with large universities, teachers’ institutions shifted their values and priorities—usually by minimizing or de-emphasizing their role in teacher education. The goal always, it seemed, was to become a comprehensive, research-oriented university.

**MAMMON AND THE MONOLITHS**

The transformation of relatively simple colleges into university organizations of great scope and structural complexity was not achieved without some stress and strain. The expanded role of the university president illustrated the process. What academic governing bodies were searching for in a president was once described by Rutherford B. Hayes, a member of Ohio State’s board in the early 1890s: “We are looking for a man of fine appearance, of commanding presence, one who will impress the public; he must be a fine speaker at public assemblies; he must be a great scholar and a great teacher; he must be a preacher also, as some think; he must be a man of winning manners; he must have tact so that he can get along with and govern the faculty; he must be
popular with the students; he must also be a man of business training, a man of affairs; he must be a great administrator.” Hayes was undoubtedly correct when he pointed out, “Gentlemen, there is no such man.”

The need, as Thorstein Veblen described it in *The Higher Learning in America* (1918), was for “captains of erudition” — which is to say, men who somehow miraculously combined the sagacity of a Mark Hopkins with the business acumen of a Rockefeller or a Carnegie. Wanted were individuals who could perform for academe the functions served elsewhere in American society by captains of corporate business and industry. Gone were the kindly old presidents of yesteryear who knew everyone by name, greeted new arrivals in person, and took a personal interest in the academic progress of each student entrusted to their care. They would be supplanted by a new breed of academic executive officers well versed in the intricacies of finance and administration, executive managers whose duties would inevitably remove them not only from faculty and students but increasingly from academics as well.

One of the more obvious changes when it came to selecting a university’s administrative leader was the preference for laymen over clergymen. Whereas 90 percent of all college presidents serving in 1860 had trained for the ministry, by 1933 no more than 12 percent had theological preparation. The stereotypical minister was perceived to be lacking in worldly skills and ways. He was associated in the minds of many with a classical curriculum instead of the more practical or utilitarian learning favored by trustees. And because institutions themselves were becoming more secular and less subject to religious influences, one by one various private and public colleges departed from precedent and elected laypersons to their presidencies: Denison in 1889, Illinois College in 1892, Yale in 1899, Princeton in 1902, Marietta in 1913, Bowdoin in 1918, Wabash in 1926. Replacing yesterday’s clerics were lawyers, former military leaders, politicians and businessmen with experience or money.

Despite laments over the passing of the old-time college president, increasing enrollments and greatly enlarged endowments seemed to render him something of an anachronism. The modern imperative, as trustees saw it, was to secure someone capable of supplying strong, directive leadership to all of a university’s far-flung endeavors. His challenge was to hold the institution together, reconciling as much as possible of the disparate elements and interests — students, faculty, alumni, external constituents — while simultaneously imparting to all a sense of shared mission and purpose. Upon the president depended the success with which the university transcended its internal differences and moved forward in accord. Hence, while it had once been customary to regard the college president as primus inter pares, first among his faculty equals, the clear and distinct trend in the early 1900s was toward thinking of him simply as primus. Whereas once the president had served non dominus sed dux (as “a leader, not a master”), now it was becoming ever more difficult to separate the two roles.

Because an institution of higher learning needed a continuous flow of funds for its support, raising money became the president’s most urgent task. Finding prospective donors and wooing them was likely to occupy most of his energies. It was a task that could only draw him even further away from campus affairs. Responding to complaints that presidents were being turned into financial drummers for their institutions to the virtual exclusion of all else, Langdon Stewardson of Hobart College replied, “Disagreeable as the job of money-raising actually is, the President clearly recognizes that it is for him a plain and imperative duty.” To the president fell the job of persuading wealthy corporate donors — the McCormicks, the Havemeyers, the Goulds, the Rockefellers, the Vanderbilts — to bestow their largesse. If he was successful, millions poured in for new buildings, new departments, new professional schools.

On the other hand, corporate philanthropy could be a mixed blessing, particularly to the degree to which donations came with strings attached. It was often the case, for example, that a recipient was obliged to match or even double the amount of some prospective contribution as a precondition for its bestowal. Second, many benefactors sought to influence institutional policy or to earmark funds for some specialized purpose. It then fell to the president to negotiate the terms of a gift, protecting the university’s academic independence as best he could. Third, benefactors began seeking places on collegiate governing boards. The outcome was boards of trustees dominated not by scholars, but by businessmen whose priorities and loyalties were not always aligned with, or especially responsive to, academic considerations.

Philanthropic organizations such as the Carnegie Foundation, established in 1906, and the Rockefeller Foundation, begun in 1913, began to take on a life of their own within academe, holding out the promise of gifts only if universities met certain conditions. University leaders found it difficult to resist demands for the elimination of duplication and waste, for consolidation, for nonsectarianism, or whatever else was mandated. More than a few institutions — Drake, Coe, Hanover, Rochester, and perhaps a score of others — rather promptly shed their denominational affiliations, for example, in exchange for foundation support. Academic leaders grew troubled by the expanding power of external bodies. President Jacob Gould Schurman of Cornell expressed his misgivings in 1909 when he declared that “the very ambition of such corporations to reform educational abuses is itself a source of danger. Men are not constituted educational reformers by having a million dollars to spend.”
donors believed otherwise. Rockefeller’s General Education Board in its 1914 report, for instance, defended its efforts to bring a greater measure of rationality and standardization to educational reform. “The states have not generally shown themselves competent to deal with higher education on a nonpartisan, impersonal, and comprehensive basis,” the report alleged. “Rival religious bodies have invaded fields fully—or more than fully—occupied already; misguided individuals have founded a new college instead of strengthening an old one.” Foundations were resolved to put an end to all such abuses and bring more efficient business management to academe. Philanthropic corporations were fast becoming a power to be reckoned with by academic leaders.

Other external bodies besides foundations were beginning to exercise a formative influence of their own. In 1892 the National Education Association’s famous Committee of Ten had taken on the task of trying to standardize secondary curricular requirements for admission to college. A later Committee of Twelve went further in outlining a common set of collegiate admission standards. Finally, at the urging of Columbia’s Nicholas Murray Butler, those attending an 1899 meeting of the Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools of the Middle Atlantic States and Maryland took under consideration a proposal to create an independent board of examiners responsible for administering academic achievement tests to college applicants.

President Ethelbert D. Warfield of Lafayette College led the opposition. “Lafayette College does not intend to be told by any Board whom to admit and whom not to admit,” he informed the assembled delegates. “If we wish to admit the son of a benefactor, or of a Trustee, or of a member of the Faculty, and such action will benefit the institution we are not going to be prevented from taking it.” Harvard’s Charles Eliot rose to issue a rejoinder. “The President of Lafayette College has misunderstood,” he declared. “It will be perfectly practicable under this plan for Lafayette College to say, if it chooses, that it will admit only such students as cannot pass these examinations.” Amid laughter from the audience, Eliot added, “No one proposes to deprive Lafayette College of that privilege.” Opposition now effectively silenced, the first College Board examinations were held in June of 1901. Ten years later, at least two dozen leading eastern colleges and universities were making use of test scores in deciding who to admit.

Yet another factor in the changing power equation was the growing influence of university alumni. American higher education in the early twentieth century had reached a point in its development where large numbers of college graduates had achieved positions of wealth. They qualified as potential supporters of colleges and universities alongside corporate foundations. Academic leaders thus began turning to alumni for financial help. But not unlike corporate givers, donors had a tendency to exhibit a certain proprietary attitude of their own. Organized into increasingly powerful associations largely outside or beyond the direct control of the very institutions to which they gave allegiance, alumni groups began to exert more and more influence. In exchange for their generosity, they too expected their elected representatives to be granted positions on governing boards. Rare was the college administration capable of ignoring the wishes of alums when it came to policies affecting those aspects of collegiate life that most interested them. Typically, their support was for stadia, not studia, for athletic gymnasias, not laboratories or libraries, for extracurricular matters rather than activities lying at the very core of the academic enterprise. Hence a certain distortion of institutional purpose was introduced at the expense of scholarship and instruction. Yet it was a tendency most hard-pressed college presidents were unable—or possibly unwilling—to resist.

**BUREAUCRATIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ETHOS**

The development of universities as bureaucratic organizations was the result of increased size, expanding student enrollments, and demands for new services. Bureaucratization represented also a logical if unplanned response to the need to keep teachers and researchers free from the detailed but essential duties required in managing a complex organization. Formerly, a small college had been able to make do with a president, a bursar or treasurer, and perhaps a part-time librarian. Now, given universities’ enlarged functions and scope, administrative duties necessarily grew more specialized and divided. The result was a hierarchical arrangement long familiar in business though new to academia. At the top reposed the board of trustees and the president. To the president’s office was appended a registrar, then vice-presidents and associate vice-presidents, a chief business officer, then in succession, deans, an admissions director, and, in time, an array of secretaries and subordinate administrative assistants. Full-time administrators were placed in charge of student affairs, faculty relations, institutional development, athletics, facilities management, custodial functions, and other operations. The actual exercise of power downward through the graduated ranks of the administrative hierarchy might vary, but within each rank specific roles began to develop. Roughly paralleling the administrative structure, of course, was the graduated system of faculty rankings: department heads, full professors, associate and assistant professors, instructors, and several classes of graduate students.

The new generation of professors just embarking upon their careers in the early years of the twentieth century probably accepted the university’s administrative structure with a certain degree of equanimity. But to some faculty,
The acknowledged need for bureaucracy notwithstanding, critics were quick to point out its obvious affinity with the corporate business mentality as a whole. John Jay Chapman, writing in 1909, was among the first to complain about how thoroughly businesslike attitudes and methods had infiltrated academic life. “The men who stand for education and scholarship have the ideals of business men,” he declared. “They are, in truth, business men. The men who control [universities] to-day are very little else than business men, running a large department store which dispenses education to the millions.”

John Dewey deplored what he called “the atmosphere of money-getting and money-spending” prevailing in academia, which, he claimed, “hides from view the interests for the sake of which money alone has a place.” Thorstein Veblen’s The Higher Learning in America, written mostly before 1910, detected the hand of business control dominating practically every aspect of the modern university. The tendency to expend large sums on impressive buildings; the growth of bureaucracy; the prominence given intercollegiate athletics; the preponderance of vocational courses of instruction offered; the undignified scramble for prestige, competitive advantage, and power among institutions—all, so far as Veblen was concerned, were symptoms of the corrupting influence of the business ethos.

Upton Sinclair, writing in The Goose-step: A Study of American Education (1923) concurred. Love of power and money, he judged, had irremediably undermined the academic integrity of most institutions of higher learning in America, and with it their leadership. As for the typical university president, Sinclair dismissed him as “the most universal faker and the most variegated prevaricator that has yet appeared in the civilized world.”

The university, observed one commentator, writing in a 1900 issue of the Nation, “cannot follow the definite, precise methods employed by the manufacturer... from the very obvious fact that [students] are not precisely alike, and are not, moreover, mere passive blocks of raw material.” Andrew S. Draper of the University of Illinois agreed, noting in an Atlantic Monthly article in 1906, “Of course the university cannot become a business corporation, with a business corporation’s ordinary implications... The distinguishing ear-marks of an American university are its moral purpose, its scientific aim, its unselfish public service, its inspirations to all men in all noble things, and its incorruptibility by commercialism.” Draper then went on to add a vital qualification: “Sane and essential business methods should... be applied to the management of its business affairs. It is a business concern as well as a moral and intellectual instrumentality, and if business methods are not applied to its management it will break down.”

There was a certain ineradicable logic to the growth of academic administration and bureaucracy, a seeming inevitability about it all that made criticism ineffectual, and outright resistance nearly impossible. Much of the growth and complexity had come about unplanned. As President Angell of Michigan, writing in 1904, observed almost ruefully, “Our rather multifarious usages... have grown up without much system under peculiar exigencies.” More than a few critics went on at length about what was being lost, about the erosion of academic community and collegiality in an age increasingly enamored of Taylorite efficiency and operational rationality. But protests were to little avail. To oppose growth seemed vaguely quixotic, carrying with it (to mix the metaphor) the risk of being branded as the latter-day equivalent of a Luddite attempting to thwart progress.

In any case, not even the most ardent critics of business influence were prepared to advocate the elimination of bureaucracy entirely. To do so, faculty would have had to collect tuition payment themselves, pay for buildings and equipment, raise endowments, compile and file reports, keep accounts, supervise student admissions and course registrations, and otherwise attend to the myriad tasks since assumed by administrative functionaries. They agreed with Draper’s position that any other alternative was unthinkable, that without the organizational infrastructure that was fast becoming a distinguishing characteristic of the modern university, the entire system would indeed “break down.” Still, many worried about the monolithic character of the institution, its growing impersonality, its tendency to dehumanize collegiate life. And more than anything else perhaps, faculty worried about their own place within the power structure.
Faculty participation in governance, professors argued, amounted to little more than a symbolic gesture extended by those who held real power. To be sure, there existed the rudiments of faculty consultation. But in the main it was more a matter of administrators sounding out opinion within the professorial ranks so as to deflect it, to isolate faculty discontent, and to disarm whatever dissension threatened to weaken the university’s official posture of unity and solidarity. An anonymous contributor to *Scribner’s Magazine* in 1907 compared the professor’s lot to that of a lowly seaman: “There is set up within the university an ‘administration’ to which I am held closely accountable,” he complained. “They steer the vessel, and I am one of the crew. I am not allowed on the bridge except when summoned; and the councils in which I participate uniformly begin at the point at which policy is already determined. I am not part of the ‘administration’, but am used by the ‘administration’... In authority, in dignity, in salary, the ‘administration’ are over me, and I am under them.” The writer then went on to compare his standing with that of “the humblest clerk in a department store,” who was allowed to remain on the sufferance “of a single despot.” The issue then, reduced to its most elemental level, was whether faculty exercised any substantial control over the circumstances of their own work. Many suspected, with John Jay Chapman, that “as the boss has been the tool of business men in politics, so the college president has been his agent in education.” Still unclear was what professors could do, individually or collectively, to avoid becoming victims of the process.

**ACADEMIC FREEDOM**

Job security had always been a tenuous affair among the nineteenth-century American professorate. Any teacher held his post at the president's pleasure, or that of his board. He could be readily dismissed if those above him so desired. When a professor was fired for expressing an unpopular point of view (within the classroom or without) it was usually a matter of his having taken a stand contrary to prevailing religious orthodoxy. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the grounds upon which a professor was liable to get into trouble shifted to the political and economic sphere. Over and over again the same pattern repeated itself: an academic publicly urged reforms or criticized the existing social order and was then summarily dismissed for his trouble. In 1892, it was George M. Steele, president of Lawrence College, who was fired for his leanings “toward free trade and greenbacks”; the next year, the president of North Dakota Agricultural College was fired for unspecified “political” reasons; in 1894 Richard T. Ely, a professor of economics at Wisconsin, was charged with fomenting public unrest for his views on labor relations and corporate abuse; I. A. Hourwich of the University of Chicago was dismissed the same year for participating in a Populist convention; in 1895 Edward W. Bemis, an economist at Chicago, was dismissed for imprudently criticizing monopolies and the railroad industry; in 1896 John R. Commons, an economist from Indiana University, lost his job for promulgating controversial political views; in 1897 Allen Smith, a political scientist employed at Marietta College, was severed from his post over “antimonopoly teaching”; and in 1897 E. Benjamin Andrews of Brown was forced to resign for having advanced views favorable to free silver. To Thomas Elmer Will of Kansas State, writing in 1901, the lesson to be drawn from the long chronicle of professors who had lost their positions for presuming to speak out on social issues was a simple one. “With the arrogance equalling that of the slave power,” he claimed, “our plutocracy has issued its edict that the colleges and universities must fall into line.”

Of all the academic freedom cases that attracted public attention, the dismissal of Edward A. Ross from Stanford University in November of 1900 aroused the most controversy. The previous May, Ross had given a speech opposing Asian immigration. He followed it up with another speech shortly thereafter in which he failed to oppose municipal ownership of public utilities. Jane Lathrop Stanford, wife of Leland Stanford, the university’s founder, who served as sole trustee (and considered the institution her personal possession with which she could do whatever she liked) directed President David Starr Jordan to dismiss Ross forthwith. Jordan was something of an autocrat in his own right, having been hired because he reportedly could manage university affairs “like the president of a railroad.” It was reported of him by a friend, for example, that Jordan avoided convening his faculty because “the holding of faculty meetings inevitably led to differences of opinion in the faculty, and... the best way to avoid the forming of parties in the faculty was never to get the faculty together except perhaps for a yearly meeting.” Despite a personal friendship with Ross, Jordan felt he was in no position to oppose Mrs. Stanford’s repeated demands. In November he demanded Ross’s resignation. A major controversy ensued. Several faculty members resigned in protest. In the end, however, Ross failed to recover his position.

The Ross case renewed a debate about freedom of teaching and research, an issue that had been raised only intermittently during previous decades and then usually involving expressions of belief connected with the controversy between science and religion, evolution and fundamentalist creationism. Ross’s defenders argued that so-called “extramural” utterances, that is, pronouncements issued by a professor outside of the classroom, were as deserving of academic protection as what was taught inside the classroom or written for publication. The hallowed tradition of *Lehrfreiheit*, of freedom to
teach and research without outside interference, was an absolute right and should be considered sacrosanct. If corporate business interests or their agents were allowed to dictate what a professor might profess, so it was argued, the integrity of all scholarship within a college or university was directly threatened.

Those who supported President Jordan’s action in firing Edward Ross, on the other hand, tended to respond in one of three ways: denying there was any vital principle of academic freedom at stake; denouncing academic freedom as an archaic and outmoded concept lacking current application; or affirming freedom in the abstract while insisting that professorial prerogatives should always be kept subordinate to an institution’s legitimate concern for its own reputation.31

Andrew S. Draper of Illinois summed up his own thinking with the simple declaration that “fool talk” should never be allowed within a university.32 Historian Frederick Jackson Turner in 1902 recalled comparable sentiments expressed “when the members of the Board of Regents of Wisconsin used to sit with a red lead pencil in consultation over the lists of books submitted by their professors, and strike out those that failed to please their fancy, with irreverent comments on ‘fool professors.’” For President W. H. P. Faunce of Brown University in 1901, the issue was about the extent to which “incendiary enthusiasm” for unorthodox views should be protected, and the degree to which free speech should be balanced against responsible speech. As he put it, “If to this principle of freedom of speech we add the equally important principle of responsibility for speech, responsibility to the institutions we represent, and to the public whose confidence we value, we have a sound and sensible basis for our academic future.” According to President W. O. Thompson of Ohio State, writing in 1910, any professor contemplating the airing of an unpopular viewpoint needed to be reminded of his responsibility to behave like a “gentleman.” “If we regard the institution as a conservator of society’s best interest and at the same time a leader in the search for the truth,” he felt confident, “reasonable people will at once agree that the orderly progress of research and scholarship does not demand unnecessary offenses.”33

Alton B. Parker, a former judge of the New York Court of Appeals and later a presidential candidate for the Democrats, in 1904 gave expression to the typical conservative view of property interests: “When in opposition to the wishes or without the consent of the supporters of the institution [a professor] persists in a course that must tend to impress upon the tender minds of the young under his charge theories deemed to be false by a vast majority of the most intelligent minds of the age, it seems to me that he has abused his privilege of expression of opinion to such an extent as to justify the governing board in terminating his engagement.” Professors, in other words, should refrain from voicing positions opposed by a majority, or, as Parker and others were agreed, when the utterance in question was likely to “inflame public sentiment.”34 Therein lay the crux of the matter. For faculty defenders of academic freedom, issues of high principle were at stake. To their opponents, however, the dispute was not about ideas, and still less about truth. Rather, questions of academic freedom were about public relations, about the consequences of having one of a school’s members voicing sentiments calculated to arouse the ire of those upon whom the university necessarily depended for support.

A professor by the name of Ira W. Howeth, writing in 1900, summed up the issue of academic freedom from the professorial side. “It is contended by the authorities that there is complete liberty, and the claim is logical, for they make a careful distinction between liberty and license,” he observed, “Thought is free so long as it is sound, and the authorities have their own convictions in regard to what constitutes sound thinking. While freedom of thought is doubtless increasing in all our higher institutions of learning . . . yet it is probably true to-day that there is not a college or university in the country that would long tolerate an active and formidable advocate of serious changes in the present social order. He would be required to go, and the occasion of his removal would not be avowed as opposition to intellectual liberty, but to his capacity as evidenced by his vagarious opinions.”35

Coupled with professors’ demands for academic freedom was a plea for greater job security. As Henry Seidel Canby recalled, “Our strongest desire was to be made safe, to stay where we were on a living wage, to be secure while we worked. . . . No scraping, no outside earning, could safeguard us. We were dependent upon the college, which itself was always pressed for money, and could not be counted upon to be either judicious or just.”36 (During the period to which Canby was referring, the average faculty salary was extremely low, about the same as a skilled industrial worker.) The problem was that in the opening years of the twentieth century there was still no legal recourse for redressing grievances. Courts, disinclined to interfere in the internal affairs of academic institutions, had not yet taken cognizance of the principle of academic freedom. Consequently, no matter how reasoned were the arguments advanced on professors’ behalf, demands for a living wage, for job security, and for freedom to teach and publish without fear of hindrance, they were virtually unenforceable. So far as many university trustees were concerned, an errant professor was an employee of the institution, no more, no less. If his conduct was displeasing to management, officials were entitled to give him his walking papers as readily as business executives might fire any factory hireling. In short, claims to special status or autonomy for professors were rejected out of hand.”37
The beginnings of a response came in 1915 with the formation of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), an outgrowth of a series of discussions and planning efforts jointly conducted by the American Economic Association, the American Sociological Society, and the American Political Science Association. By no means did the new organization win immediate acceptance or broad support, even within the professorate. To some, the idea of a general academic association of college and university teachers too closely resembled unionism. The *New York Times*, reporting on the group's inception, let loose with a broadside against "organized dons" and ridiculed academic freedom as "the unalienable right of every college instructor to make a fool of himself and the college by . . . intemperate, sensational prattle about every subject under the sun, to his classes and the public, and still keep on the payroll or be reft therefrom only by elaborate process." In spite of such criticism, the AAUP's leadership moved ahead with the preparation of a draft Statement of Principles outlining the importance of safeguarding academic freedom and tenure in the nation's colleges and universities. The document emphasized that professors should be allowed to speak on their own authority and not be made to serve merely as "echoes of the opinions of the lay public or of the individuals who endow or manage universities." In the years that followed, even while instances of alleged abridgements and violations continued unabated, the AAUP became the single most influential and important defender of professorial tenure and academic freedom.

No sooner had the American Association of University Professors established itself as a voice of the professorate and enunciated a statement of principles than it was faced with a succession of crises brought about with the advent of World War I. Even as the fighting in Europe raged on, Americans at home found themselves deeply divided in their opinions about the conflict. Some professors in their public declarations assumed a posture of militant pacifism. The United States, they warned, should lend aid to its allies, but at all costs should avoid allowing itself to be drawn into the conflagration. At the opposite extreme, a few academics adopted a pro-German position, up to and including urgings that America take up Germany's cause in the war. Unpopular views expressed during the war years inflamed popular passions. What during calmer times might have been overlooked as merely objectionable was now regarded as outright sedition and treason. Several professors were forced out of jobs at the University of Minnesota; at Harvard a German sympathizer kept his position only when President Lowell intervened on his behalf. So far as academic freedom was concerned, most controversies turned on the paradoxical question as to whether freedom of speech could be legitimately curtailed or constrained under extraordinary wartime circumstances in order to protect the principle of free speech itself.

In the 1930s, academic freedom cases hinged on the propriety of teacher-oath statutes. As the nation sank into the greatest economic depression it had yet experienced, tolerance disappeared for views questioning whether existing American social institutions were adequate to deal with collapse or, possibly, had even contributed to the general malaise. Accordingly, state after state passed legislation requiring teachers at all levels to affirm their loyalty to the state and federal constitutions. A special AAUP committee was assembled to consider whether the imposition of involuntary loyalty oaths represented a threat to academic freedom. It concluded that if the intent of such oaths was to prevent criticism of the existing social order or to preclude anyone from offering suggestions for reform, then they did in fact pose a limitation on academic freedom. In almost all of the major cases of the day that arose over loyalty oaths, the AAUP found itself in the midst of the struggle.

Meanwhile, following a succession of joint conferences between the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges, which had begun meeting in 1934, leaders of the two organizations came together in 1940 in agreement upon a restatement of principles as set forth in a 1925 Conference Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure. In style and tone, the document gave the appearance of attempting to mollify critics of alleged professorial abuses. At the same time, it stoutly reaffirmed professors' rights to freedom of expression. "Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole," the 1940 Statement proclaimed. "The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition." Therefore, "academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies to both teaching and research. Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth. Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning."

The Statement continued, "[Academic freedom] carries with it duties correlative with rights. Freedom and economic security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society." After affirming due process and tenure rights, the AAUP paper went on to endorse a teacher's classroom freedom, though it cautioned, "he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject." Similarly, it affirmed the right of the professor as a citizen to be free from institutional censorship and discipline, but counseled him to "remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances." Hence, it was said, "he should
at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.\textsuperscript{65}

In all probability, no other single document in twentieth-century American higher education was so widely read, appealed to, discussed, or criticized as the AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles. As an effort to codify and clarify what meaning academic freedom should have for colleges and universities, its force was moral rather than legal; and it lacked provision for enforcement in particular cases. Nevertheless, what it did offer was a set of general standards to which aggrieved parties could appeal when controversies erupted. In time, most colleges and universities accepted its broad outlines, and were reluctant to be found in noncompliance with its strictures.

**COLLEGE STUDENTS AND CAMPUS LIFE**

To a growing number of American undergraduates in the first third of the twentieth century, attending college marked a pleasant interlude between the end of adolescence and the assumption of adult responsibilities. The college years in some cases amounted to little more than a prolonged childhood: a time to develop friendships, to socialize, to indulge in good fun.\textsuperscript{66} Students generally did not expect to work hard; they rarely studied any more than was minimally necessary; and regular attendance in class was the exception rather than the rule. Professors who held students to high standards were deeply resented—even while lenient professors were regarded with a certain measure of ridicule and contempt. Intense study was frowned upon as excessive; and it was thought “poor form” to earn anything better than the “gentleman’s C” in one’s courses.\textsuperscript{67} When professors first introduced announced examinations as a way to keep students in line, collegians arose in protest. When formal course papers were required, a black market in student themes quickly sprang up. There were many authentic accounts of the period reporting instances in which students earned passing grades without ever having attended classes; and of cases where students hired “widows,” or private tutors, to help them prepare for an examination in a last-minute “cram session.” Books were not often checked out of the library. It was said of some students that they had contrived never to purchase a textbook throughout the course of their entire undergraduate careers.\textsuperscript{68}

Freed from pecuniary concerns, students of the early 1900s preferred to devote themselves to good times. Most felt secure in the knowledge that while the college degree still carried with it a measure of prestige and social standing, its acquisition no longer demanded the sort of expenditure of time and effort formerly required. In 1897 an observer had commented that “if it is at all noteworthy that many of the very rich men of the United States, who have made their riches by their own energy and foresight, are not college-bred, it is certainly most significant that the sons of these men are receiving a college education.”\textsuperscript{69} Writer Calvin Thomas judged the situation in 1905 in precisely the same way: “Notwithstanding all the attacks that are made upon college, notwithstanding all the satiric questionings of its utility, its popularity steady increases. Men decry it, crack jokes about it, and—send their sons to college.”\textsuperscript{70} The credential itself, not the academic achievement it supposedly represented, was the main interest.

The collegiate atmosphere at the turn of the century and for a decade or so thereafter was one distinctly marked—for want of a better term—by a species of student infantilism.\textsuperscript{71} It was a play world in which young middle-class men occupied themselves with hoops and marbles, with nonsensical slang and pig Latin.\textsuperscript{72} Much time was given over to childish pranks. Sometimes it was a matter of disrupting a class with rhythmic foot-stomping in unison, or issuing collective groans of feigned anguish when an assignment was handed out. Elsewhere, as at Princeton in the 1890s, there was an outbreak of incidents in which students brought alarm clocks to class set to ring at frequent intervals throughout the lecture. Psychologically, the gulf between students and their teachers had never been wider. Professors, with their remote, humorless demeanor and icy formality, were considered the “enemy.” In the attitude they displayed toward students, it must be said, many professors all too frequently reciprocated in kind. Sometimes attempts were made to bridge the gap between the two: rounds of faculty teas, which students dutifully attended as a matter of social obligation, or the creation of a system of mentorships and advisement, which all too often degenerated into little more than perfunctory interviews conducted as infrequently as possible.\textsuperscript{73}

Students were not easily distracted from their preoccupation with extracurricular pursuits.\textsuperscript{74} President Woodrow Wilson of Princeton acknowledged as much in 1909 when he observed, “The work of the college, the work of its classrooms and laboratories, has become the merely formal and compulsory side of its life, and . . . a score of other things, lumped under the term ‘undergraduate activities,’ have become the vital, spontaneous, absorbing realities for nine out of every ten men who go to college.” He worried that in their indifference to academic pursuits, students were missing important benefits. As he phrased it, “If young gentlemen get from their years at college only manliness, esprit de corps, a release of their social gifts, a training in give and take, a catholic taste . . . and the standards of true sportsmen, they have gained much but they have not gained what a college should give them.”\textsuperscript{75} Wilson returned to the same theme in a 1910 baccalaureate address, when he compared college
students with trade unionists. Students, he declared, typically assumed "the attitude of employees [who] give as little as possible for what they get." Writer Randolph Bourne registered the same point in 1911. "Most of these young men," he lamented, "come ... from homes of conventional religion, cheap literature, and lack of intellectual atmosphere, bring few intellectual acquisitions with them to college, and, since most of them are going into business ... contrive to carry a minimum away with them." 

The situation was little changed in the 1920s—the age of flappers and bootleggers, coonskin coats and bathtub gin, hot jazz and new dance crazes. On college campuses across the country, academics took a decided back seat to the electing of beauty queens, popularity contests, and adulation of football heroes. Some time earlier, psychologist G. Stanley Hall had defined a college as a place "where picked youth and maidens are protected from the necessities of self-support, exempted from competition, business and to some extent from social restraint, and within the largest practicable limits left free to follow their own will." His characterization was as apt in the twenties as it had been two decades earlier. And if students seemed to be living off in a world of their own, well protected from the realities of life outside academe, much the same could be said of the professorate also. An especially acerbic critique was forthcoming from Upton Sinclair in his 1923 publication The Goose-step: A Study of American Education. "Slaves in Boston's great department store, in which Harvard University owns twenty-five hundred shares of stock, be reconciled to your long hours and low wages and sentence to die of tuberculosis," he sarcastically advised, "because upon the wealth which you produce some learned person has prepared for mankind full data on 'The Strong Verb in Chaucer'... Men who slave twelve hours a day in front of blazing white furnaces of Bethlehem, Midvale and Illinois Steel, cheer up and take a fresh grip on your shoes—you are making it possible for mankind to acquire exact knowledge concerning 'The Beginnings of the Epistolary Novel in the Romance Languages'..." Sinclair's attack may not have been representative of public opinion as a whole, but it did accurately reflect a current of popular resentment and ambivalence toward collegiate life within American society at large.

College life in the late 1920s and through the 1930s presented a somewhat more complex picture than in preceding decades. The Depression era was a shattering experience for most Americans, a time of massive economic dislocations and widespread financial hardship. In the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929, as banks collapsed like so many dominoes, people saw their life savings wiped out practically overnight. Unemployment skyrocketed. With hard times came great uncertainty and doubt—about the viability of democracy and the staying power of its social institutions in a world seemingly marching toward totalitarianism, about the capacity of laissez-faire capitalism to sustain affluence and material abundance, about the proper role of government vis-à-vis a marketplace fallen into chaos. Virtually no one was immune from the effects of the worst economic debacle in the nation's history, collegians least of all.

The scene on college campuses in the thirties was thus a study in contrasts. Between 1935 and 1943, the government poured over $93 million into emergency assistance for students. Many, lacking prospects for employment, tended to remain in school any way they could. Yet coincident with the popular impact of the automobile, movies, and radio, popular interest in collegiate athletics, for example, reached new heights; and attendance at football games across the country broke all records. Campus fads and fashions were as outrageous and varied as ever. College life (as depicted in the popular press at least) was as replete with fraternity and sorority dances, parties and light-hearted high jinks as it had ever been. Nevertheless, partially concealed behind the usual frivolity was a more serious aspect. Shocked, confused, sometimes angered by events of the times, students showed far more social awareness and a sense of political involvement than had their predecessors a decade or so before. Collegians now joined picket lines and protest marches, they circulated petitions, they demonstrated for an astonishing array of causes. Some—perhaps no more than a tiny minority—flirted with communism, hoping Marxist ideology pointed the way to a better future. Others—again, always a small minority—wondered aloud whether America had something to learn from Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. And as war clouds began to gather on the political horizon, campus peace demonstrations attracted large crowds. Students lined up by the hundreds to sign solemn pledges vowing they would never go to war. If there existed any common denominator at all, it was poverty. At Marietta College, where economic circumstances had forced the school to cut teachers' salaries in half, the campus newspaper observed sardonically that faculty had "come a lot nearer to a common feeling with the students. Now everyone on the campus can admit quite freely that he is broke." Among the more important changes to occur on college campuses nationwide throughout the first half of the twentieth century (and most especially in the twenties and thirties) was the increasing attention paid to students' extracurricular life. By the time of World War I, academic leaders were becoming persuaded that athletics, social clubs, Greek-letter societies, theater groups, campus newspapers, and student magazines—all the features of college life that seemed to occupy an increasing share of collegians' interests
and time—were evolving without benefit of adequate coordination and supervision. Nonacademic activities, it was argued, carried with them a potential for substantial benefits. In terms of making students more well-rounded, forming character, encouraging socialization, and so forth, such activities could be a good thing if guided and directed into constructive channels. Perhaps it was time to revive the old-time collegiate attention to the nonintellectual side of a student’s development. Besides intellectual training, colleges and universities needed to give more attention to students’ social, emotional, and physical development. Closer supervision of students’ off-campus housing, including rooming houses and fraternity or sorority chapter houses, was required. On-campus student housing facilities needed to be expanded, refurbished, and placed under closer surveillance. Dormitories needed to be made more attractive. It seemed important to ensure students’ physical health by making certain they were afforded access to essential medical services. Taking into account the indecision of many collegians regarding their future careers, better academic counseling was also considered essential.84

From such concerns originated the student personnel movement.85 Deans of students began to appear, followed rather quickly by cadres of administrative support staff charged with overseeing dormitories, academic and career counseling centers, extracurricular activities, social events, admissions counseling, scholarships and financial aid, and so on.86 Campus chaplains became an established feature of college life, as did fraternity and sorority advisors and chaperones. By the twenties and thirties, full-time professional advisors were well on the way toward filling the gap left by professors who were unwilling or unable to take the time for mentoring and advising students. By the late 1930s and early 1940s, academic advisors had assumed extensive authority in granting waivers, helping students select courses and majors, and otherwise assisting them with decisions outside the classroom.87 Practically all observers were agreed, given the increasing size and diversity of the undergraduate population, the emergence of an elaborate extra-academic support structure was both necessary and probably inevitable.

FROM MARGINALITY TOWARD THE MAINSTREAM: NEW STUDENTS

Of the five hundred or so institutions of higher education in existence in the United States around the turn of the century, it has been estimated that perhaps no more than one fifth deserved to be considered genuine colleges or universities. Faculty teaching loads were heavy—as high as twenty-two weekly teaching hours at some schools—a figure somewhat closer to that of secondary schools than to what came to be the collegiate norm of twelve to fifteen hours in later years. Admission standards tended to remain low. Mere completion of a high-school course of study was sufficient in many cases to win entrance into a college. Inevitably, the presence of large numbers of ill-prepared collegians kept academic standards relatively depressed at all but a handful of the more prestigious universities and liberal-arts colleges. In 1870, about 52,000 students were enrolled in four-year post-secondary education, or less than 2 percent of the population aged 18 to 21. In the 1890s the figure had risen to 3 percent; and by 1900 it hovered around 4 percent, representing a total of around 238,000 undergraduates and an additional 5,700 graduate students. By the 1920s, the percentage doubled; and it was to reach 12 percent in the next decade. On the eve of World War II the figure stood at 18 percent.88

Indicative of the growing democratization of American higher education, much of the student influx responsible for college enrollment increases in the early twentieth century came from the admission of groups heretofore effectively excluded. Jewish students, as an example, were first admitted in large numbers in the second decade of the new century.89 Their arrival occasioned considerable controversy at some institutions; and in the wake of nativist prejudice that swept the country immediately after World War I, anti-Semitism became a conspicuous feature of the collegiate landscape.90 Many schools imposed special admission tests or quotas for Jews, fearful that their presence would alter the character of the schools involved, and for the worse. Typical in its expression of the general apprehension was a comment from Harvard president Abbott Lawrence Lowell in 1922. “Where Jews become numerous they drive off other people and then leave themselves,” he claimed. Lowell was undecided as to whether gentle prejudice or Semitic “clannishness” was chiefly responsible for the tendency of Jewish students to “form a distinct body, and cling . . . together, apart from the great mass of undergraduates.” A better explanation was provided by Vincent Sheean, a noted journalist of the day, who recounted (Personal History, 1936) how a former girlfriend of his at the University of Chicago had explained the student caste system to him. “The Jews,” she confided, “could not possibly go to the ‘nice’ parties in the college. They could not be elected to any class office, or to office in any club, or to any fraternity except the two that they themselves had organized; they could not dance with whom they pleased or go out with the girls they wanted to go out with; they could not even walk across the quadrangles with a ‘nice’ girl if she could possibly escape.”91

Women students were not always welcome either. Even as coeducation was being adopted by many schools throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, there were several instances where male students stoutly resisted the expanding presence of female collegians on campus. An alumnus of the
University of Wisconsin in 1877 reported that among males, "the feeling of hostility was exceedingly intense and bitter." He reported, "As I now recollect, the entire body of students were without exception opposed to the admission of the young ladies, and the anathemas heaped upon the regents were loud and deep." Practical experience had dispelled fears about women's purported frailty and mental unfitness for academic life. Possibly male resistance proceeded from the opposite fear that women would outperform them scholarly. Or, again, much of the opposition might have traced back to prevailing nineteenth-century notions of the cardinal womanly virtues—purity, piety, submissiveness, and domesticity—and the expectation that attending college would corrode or undermine coeds' feminine attributes. In any case, despite occasional opposition, the percentage of women undergraduates continued to rise, increasing from about 21 percent in 1870 to 32 percent by 1880, to almost 40 percent by 1910, and then to over 47 percent by 1920. Fears grew that women were arriving on campus in such numbers as to pose a real threat to male students. So massive an increase in female enrollment, it was predicted, might ultimately drive men out entirely.

More than a few colleges in the late 1920s began to reevaluate their commitment to coeducation. Suggestions were advanced that certain restrictive measures might be necessary. A few all-male schools that had formerly contemplated admitting women now deferred their plans indefinitely. Only fear of tuition loss and of competitive advantage with nearby institutions prevented other colleges from limiting female enrollments or otherwise imposing quotas. Several universities considered single-gender registration for certain classes once it was discovered that when women constituted the majority of those enrolled in a course, men tended to shun it. Similarly, when male enrollments predominated, women avoided the course. At the University of Chicago, a brief experiment with separate lower-level colleges for men and women was launched, then abandoned.

The decade of the twenties proved critical for educated women. During that specific ten-year span, women achieved their highest proportion of the undergraduate population, of doctoral recipients, and of faculty members. By 1930, almost a third of all college presidents and professors were women. In other professions as well, women more than held their own. In the mid-twenties, women constituted almost 45 percent of the professional work force, a share that began to decline in 1930 and reached its lowest point in 1960, after which it began climbing again. Moreover, between 1870 and 1930 the proportion of women in the various professions was nearly twice as high as that in the work force as a whole. By the end of the 1930s, the proportion of all undergraduate women had entered upon a slight decline (though the proportion of women awarded bachelor's degrees was still increasing), and the number of women as a proportion of all those awarded doctoral degrees was dropping.

Writing in 1938, Marjorie Nicolson, who was born in 1894 and received her bachelor of arts degree from the University of Michigan in 1914, described the unique situation in which many women professionals of her generation found themselves: "We came late enough," she mused, "to escape the self-consciousness and belligerence of the pioneers, to take education and training for granted. We came early enough to take equally for granted professional positions in which we could make full use of our training. This was our double glory. Positions were everywhere open to us." By no means, however, were opportunities anywhere near equal between the sexes. In academe, women were hired in record numbers in the years preceding the Depression, but invariably at lower salaries than their male peers. They were granted tenure less often; and promotions in rank came more slowly than for males. When a certain Alice Hamilton was accepted as an assistant professor on the Harvard Medical School faculty in 1919, for example, a formal provision of her appointment precluded her Marching in the commencement procession. Similar instances of discrimination against women and blatantly unequal treatment were documented in colleges and universities throughout the nation. By the late 1930s the tide of opinion had shifted and fewer women than before were embarking upon professional careers. Conventional opinion reassessed once again the woman's obligation to appear youthful, to seek to be physically attractive and submissive, to find her fulfillment not in some professional career but in the joys of domesticity.

African Americans of course had long occupied a position of marginality so far as higher education was concerned, as in all other aspects of social life. In 1899–1900, no more than eighty-eight blacks were awarded degrees from white colleges (most of them from Oberlin); and there were an estimated 475 graduated from predominantly black colleges. These new graduates, added to a pool of about 3,000 who had previously graduated (almost all of them from small, unaccredited black colleges), represented an infinitesimally small fraction of a total black population of nearly 10 million. As the twentieth century opened, there were approximately 3,900 blacks enrolled in nearly a hundred different black schools and colleges, perhaps less than two-thirds of which offered real collegiate-level courses of instruction. According to a 1917 survey of black higher education, only one of sixteen black federal land-grant schools in the former slave states offered college-level work. Of the 2,500 or so black students enrolled in colleges in the southern states, only 12 attended land-grant and state institutions. The remainder was enrolled in private black schools. Black collegiate enrollments in southern...
state institutions rose to 12,600 by 1935, while black enrollments in black private colleges nationwide increased to almost 17,000—still representing only a small proportion of the country’s total black population. In 1917 only 33 out of almost a hundred private black colleges were identified as teaching at anything remotely approaching the college level, and nearly all lacked significant endowments. As late as the 1930s, precollegiate enrollments represented 40 percent of the total combined student enrollment in all black institutions of higher learning. At a time when at least 5 percent of all whites aged 18 to 21 were attending college, the figure for blacks stood at less than one-third of 1 percent. A 1928 survey revealed there were less than 14,000 black students receiving collegiate-level instruction, three-quarters of whom were attending private black institutions. By the mid-1930s, the number of black students attending college had grown to 19,000, the vast majority of whom were now enrolled in public black colleges, fewer in private black colleges, and only a very small percentage attending predominantly white institutions. Perhaps the only bright spot in an otherwise dismal picture was the fact that by 1939, 119 doctoral degrees had been awarded to blacks by leading white colleges and universities. Most had previously attended black undergraduate schools, public or private.

Lack of progress in the struggle for racial equality undoubtedly owed much to the indifference or antipathy demonstrated by the country’s white majority. By 1900 many whites who in previous decades had lent strong leadership to the black cause had now withdrawn their support. Despite Jim Crow legislation throughout the South and widespread discrimination in the North, the tendency among many liberals was to believe that the worst was over, that all that could be done had in fact been accomplished. From now on, many believed, blacks themselves would have to exercise the initiative, that further progress would depend almost exclusively on the ambitions and abilities of African Americans working on their own. More broadly, the tacit consensus seemed to be that a racially separate and unequal society was about all that could be hoped for once the more egregious symbols of a slave past had been eliminated. In vain, black leaders such as W. E. B. DuBois and others railed against the injustice of the system, protested against prejudice and bigotry, and appealed for assistance.

In a 1930 commencement address at Howard University, DuBois chastised black male students for their insularity and indifference. “Our [black] college man today is, on the average, a man untouched by real culture,” he complained. “He deliberately surrenders to selfish and even silly ideals, swarming into semiprofessional athletics and Greek letter societies, and affecting to despise scholarship and the hard grind of study and research.” DuBois urged his listeners to rouse themselves from complacency. “The greatest meetings of the Negro college year like those of the white college year,” he noted disgustedly, “have become vulgar exhibitions of liquor, extravagance, and fur coats. We have in our colleges a growing mass of stupidity and indifference.” Historian and educator Carter G. Woodson argued in 1933 that the “miseducation” of black students had led to the emergence of a poorly educated but reactionary bourgeoisie whose individual members had grown estranged from “the very people upon whom they must eventually count for carrying out a program of progress.”

Many others sounded the same theme. In 1934 black poet Langston Hughes denounced what he characterized as the “cowards from the colleges” who had acceded to the general subjugation of their own people and failed to face up to the harsh realities of a racist society. Lafayette Harris, president of Philander Smith College in Little Rock, Arkansas, castigated black students for their apathy and social irresponsibility. “Probably nothing gives one more concern than the frequently apparent fatalistic and nonchalant attitude of many a Negro college student and educated Negro,” he alleged. “With him very little seems to matter except meals, sleep and folly. Community problems are never even recognized as existing.” So far as he was concerned, the vast majority of black students he had observed knew “nothing of their less fortunate fellowmen.”

If African Americans did not seize their own destiny in their own hands, black critics insisted, they would be implicated in consigning future generations of black youths to the same inequalities and injustices endured by generations past.

Black youths seeking a college education faced two unpalatable alternatives. If they chose to attend a black college, they were apt to find themselves in a small, struggling institution lacking the accreditation standing, status, resources, and support enjoyed by white schools. If admitted to a white school, they faced barriers built of fear and racial prejudice. They were outsiders. The proportion of black students on northern campuses rarely if ever reached more than 2 percent, and usually it never exceeded one half of 1 percent of a college’s total enrollment. At Harvard in 1914 President Abbott Lawrence Lowell closed the freshmen dormitories to blacks, explaining later on that though the buildings originally had been built to reduce students’ social segregation, he felt it was important not to offend whites by introducing a black within their midst. A rule was passed stipulating that no one was to be excluded “by reason of his color,” but in the same breath it declared that “men of the white and colored races shall not be compelled to live and eat together.” The University of Chicago met the problem by allowing a majority of students in a dormitory to decide through formal vote whether a black
would be allowed accommodations. Elsewhere, qualified blacks were freely admitted as students, but discouraged from interacting socially with their white peers. At some integrated institutions, according to local newspaper accounts of the time, the specter of miscegenation loomed large in people’s minds.

Elythe Hargrove, a black freshman enrolled at the University of Michigan in 1942, arrived knowing her social life would be practically nonexistent. “First of all,” she later wrote, “being a Negro, I was exempt from all the sororities on the campus. I knew that I would never dress for a sorority ‘rush’ party, or become a pledge. I knew, also, that I would never dance at the [fraternity] houses.” She recalled one occasion “when I was among three hundred girls at a social dance, and the instructor and one other girl ventured to drag me over the floor, when all of the other girls had run frantically clutching at each other to dance with everyone else but me, simply because I was a Negro, a brown conspicuous person. That was the time I went home and fell across the bed and cried, cried until I was exhausted. That was the time I hated a white college.”

Legal action was needed to tear down racial barriers. In 1934, to cite one instance, Donald Gaines Murray, a black graduate of Amherst College applied for admission to the University of Maryland’s law school. Refused admission for reasons of color, he appealed through the courts and won the right to be admitted. Victory in the Murray case established the vital precedent for a similar suit filed shortly thereafter. Once again a black student, Lloyd Lionel Gaines, a graduate of Lincoln University in Jefferson City, Missouri, was denied admission to the law school at the University of Missouri in Columbia. The case ultimately made its way up to the United States Supreme Court. In December of 1938, the chief justices held that the state was bound to furnish “within its borders facilities for legal education substantially equal to those . . . afforded for persons of the white race.” The Gaines decision fell far short of extending genuine equality of opportunity since, for all practical purposes, it still allowed separation at the expense of equality. Nevertheless, it marked an important advancement of sorts; and for blacks in the late 1930s, even small symbolic victories had to count for something.

**CURRICULAR INNOVATIONS AND EXPERIMENTS**

The first four decades of the twentieth century witnessed a remarkable flurry of curricular reform and experimentation in American higher education. The supplanting of the more or less fixed, uniform classical curriculum of the mid-1800s with an elective system and the introduction of a vast array of utilitarian courses of study by century’s end had marked an important shift in academic thought. Changes subsequently introduced between 1900 and 1940 or thereabouts in many colleges and universities, however, were equally notable. There was irony possibly in the fact that some were inspired by dissatisfaction over the results of just those innovations enacted in the period immediately preceding. In a sense, with the pendulum of academic opinion having swung far in one direction, it now began describing an arc leading in precisely the opposite direction. Specifically, the target of much criticism was the elective principle or system pioneered at Harvard under President Eliot.

The original idea of allowing undergraduates to select their own patterns of study had been prompted by a desire to make academics more interesting and relevant. Instead of being compelled to submit to a single regimen of subjects selected for their supposed disciplinary value, students were allowed to pick and choose, based on their own individual interests, preferences, and career aspirations. But taken to its extreme, whatever gains had been registered by permitting unlimited personal choice were set off—or so it now seemed to many—by a concomitant loss of coherence and intellectual integration. The elective system, in a word, had borne bitter fruit. Its application had resulted in fragmentation; in courses taken in isolation from one another, the whole lacking any overall unity or design. Specialization of interest and professionalism, many warned, had advanced to the point where general education of a more liberating character was suffering neglect and might soon disappear entirely. The traditional concept of liberal learning had assumed a common humanity, a belief that despite differing abilities, interests, needs, and vocations, people should share in the accumulated wisdom of the past. Within society there were certain responsibilities—for example, those concerned with citizenship—which could be discharged only in the exercise of a type of understanding possessed by all. Perhaps the idea of a shared “culture” or paideia had been too narrowly circumscribed in the classical conception of liberal learning. Yet the social and personal needs it sought to satisfy were real. Some common learning, many argued, was indispensable. Or, alternatively, the problem now was to find a way to hold modern learning together.

As reaction to the “smorgasbord” or “cafeteria” curricular approach set in, many former advocates of electives reversed themselves. It was time now, they claimed, to seek a better balance between elective anarchy and rigid curricular prescription. Writing from retirement in 1908, Andrew D. White expressed his second thoughts on the matter. “There is certainly a widespread fear among many thinking men,” he acknowledged, “that in our eagerness for . . . new things we have too much lost sight of certain valuable old things, the things in university education which used to be summed up under the word ‘culture.’” Having come almost full circle in his own thinking, White urged, “I believe that, whatever else we do, we must [not only] make men and women skillful
in the various professions and avocations of life, but...[also] cultivate and bring out the best in them as men and women."

Even as academicians continued to make vague rhetorical obeisance to the demand for social utility, they returned to the theme of liberal culture as the proper aim of higher learning. At an alumni dinner in 1904 Princeton's Woodrow Wilson declared the university should be "not a place of special but of general education, not a place where a lad finds his profession, but a place where he finds himself." Wilson resolutely opposed the creeping vocationalism of academe. "If the chief end of man is to make a living, why, make a living any way you can," he advised. "But if ever has been shown to him in some quiet place where he has been withdrawn from the interests of the world, that the chief end of man is to keep his soul untouched from corrupt influences, and to see to it that his fellow-men hear the truth from his lips, he will never get that out of consciousness again."

Defenders of liberal culture repeatedly returned to the same themes. Vocationalism had superseded liberal learning. Professionalism was rampant. Technocracy and amorality reign ed supreme. Appreciation had been lost for that generous, broad learning that "liberated" the learner from ignorance, provincialism, and philistinism—perhaps almost in the biblical sense of "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Institutions of higher learning stood in danger of losing their moorings, their guiding sense of identity. Higher education had surrendered to a trade-school mentality, and in process had substituted ignoble ends for those higher values that had once given it intellectual purpose and dignity. A. Lawrence Lowell was insistent on the point. Not all subjects are equally useful or liberal, he argued. "Any man who is to touch the world on many sides, or touch it strongly," he observed, "must have at his command as large a stock as possible of the world's store of knowledge and experience; and...bookkeeping does not furnish this in the same measure as literature, history, and science."

The question, of course, was how to balance out professional and liberal aims. One practical expedient that eventually suggested itself was a "concentration and distribution" requirement. That is, as a sort of compromise, students would "concentrate" their studies in a given discipline or an assemblage of closely related disciplines (i.e., select an academic "major"). At the same time they were to "distribute" or spread their other choices across a range of subjects in the sciences, arts, and humanities. The academic major would afford "depth" of content; the distribution would safeguard "scope" or breadth of coverage. The former was the antidote to intellectual shallowness or dilettantism. The latter would serve as the corrective to narrow overspecialization. The chief virtue of such a balancing act, supporters argued, was that it mandated valuable exposure to fields of knowledge a student might otherwise seek to avoid. It promoted balance among many disciplines and different forms of knowledge. At the same time it allowed—and required—a student to acquire more than a passing acquaintance with one particular specialization. Admitting of almost endless variations, some such system of concentration and distribution ultimately came to be adopted at dozens, then hundreds of colleges and universities throughout the country.

An alternative approach that placed still greater emphasis upon synoptic integration focused upon what came to be called "general education," "general studies," or "general culture." As early as 1902, John Dewey, among others, was suggesting that overcrowded courses of study lacked much internal logic or cohesion. They were, he claimed, deficient in terms of organizing structure or some larger architeconic frame of reference. He argued that a way was needed to integrate the parts, to pull them together holistically so that interrelations among their constituent elements would become more apparent. No one seemed clear about what would suffice for the purpose, but Dewey's partial suggestion was for "a survey, at least, of the universe in its manifold phases from which a student can get an 'orientation' to the larger world.”

Among the earliest to try out the idea was Alexander Meiklejohn, who while serving as dean and professor of philosophy at Brown in the years before World War I, developed an undergraduate survey course in 1914 entitled "Social and Economic Institutions." Ten years later he was advocating two different types of general survey courses, one for first-year students and another as a "capstone" experience for fourth-year students. The latter served as the prototype for senior symposia introduced in 1924 at Reed College in Oregon. Their stated purpose, it was announced, was to assist students in achieving a synthesis of the multiple historical, literary, and scientific forces shaping contemporary society. Earlier, Reed had been among the first to require a qualifying examination prior to the senior year as well as the preparation and oral defense of a senior thesis. Symbolizing Reed's commitment to academics was its virtual elimination of all extracurricular activities.

In 1928 Alexander Meiklejohn moved to the University of Wisconsin where he was instrumental in establishing a new, experimental two-year college. Briefly, its underlying theme was that students enrolled would devote their entire first year to the study of Greek and Roman civilization, utilizing a variety of disciplinary perspectives—historical, literary, economic, social, and cultural. Classes were to be kept small and informal. In the second year, students would turn their attention to an intensive analysis of modern civilization, once again as illuminated from an interdisciplinary vantage point. Throughout, the effort would be to trace connections and relationships among
many different disciplinary prisms. In practice what ensued amounted to a return to a prescribed course of study, with few variations or options to accommodate students' individual interests.

By far the most celebrated approach to general education was that begun by John Erskine at Columbia University in 1919 when his popular "war issues" course, now reworked and revised as "Introduction to Contemporary Civilization," was required of all entering freshmen. The Columbia course was the first of several that emphasized historical social development through the reading and discussion of primary sources. "There is a certain minimum of ... [the Western] intellectual and spiritual tradition that a man must experience and understand if he is to be called educated," a faculty prospectus explained. By 1936 Columbia was also offering an integrative humanities sequence, then a survey of the sciences. Before long, the Columbia and Reed prototypes were being tried out on scores of other campuses. Extensive experimentation followed as colleges and universities attempted to provide their students with the broad outlines of human knowledge through various synoptic surveys and introductory overviews of the disciplines. Especially noteworthy were survey courses developed at Dartmouth in the 1920s, and a social ethics course started at the University of Utah around 1930 treating "the ethical foundations of private and public action in human relations."

Even as general survey courses came into vogue, however, they too were severely criticized. Charges of shallowness, of superficiality, and lack of depth were frequent. A common complaint was that introductory courses treated those enrolled in them as prospective majors in the disciplines represented, thereby frustrating the original intent of providing a broad intellectual perspective. Others faulted surveys for their apparent lack of structure. Alexander Meiklejohn himself, in criticizing the typical survey course, described it as "a little music, a taste of philosophy, a glimpse into history, some practice in the technique of the laboratory, a thrill or two in the appreciation of poetry." Quite obviously, the discovery or invention of a way of bringing knowledge into some kind of unity was a difficult task, one not easily achieved by any single method. Much of the curricular history of higher learning in America between the 1920s and the 1940s in fact turned on the issue of how colleges and universities attempted to avoid the intellectual anarchy of excessive specialization. Gradually, however, it became established policy to give over most or all of the first two years of the collegiate experience to general education. The most striking feature of the various schemes devised was their diversity of approach. Breadth of intellectual experience was a common theme, but otherwise no uniform patterns emerged.

Some institutions retained the emphasis upon "survey" or "orientation" courses. Others, like Princeton, tried out a preceptorial plan of instruction, taking the approach that academic integration was best achieved by having students work closely with supervisory preceptors in highly individualized study programs. At Harvard under President Lowell the emphasis was upon general examinations and the distinction introduced between "honors" and "pass" courses. At Swarthmore in the early 1920s under Frank Aydelotte, experiments were begun with special colloquia, honors instruction separate from the regular course of instruction, and general final examinations conducted entirely by external examiners. At Yale and elsewhere, efforts were made to revive the sense of intimacy and individualized attention supplied by special "houses" or student "colleges." At Hiram College in Ohio, beginning in 1934, a pattern of intensive study of one subject at a time, to the exclusion of all others, was inaugurated. Arthur E. Morgan at Antioch College in 1921 inspired a revival of the work-study idea, this time as a five-year program combining liberal education, social training, and real-life work aimed at bringing students face to face with "practical realities in all their stubborn complexity." Experimental progressive colleges, such as Black Mountain in North Carolina and women's schools such as Sarah Lawrence and Bennington, mounted Deweyan programs emphasizing extramural work requirements, interdisciplinary courses, individualized studies aimed at addressing current social issues and problems, and independent study.

If concern for meeting the needs of exceptionally talented learners was the preoccupation of northeastern Ivy League schools, at the University of Minnesota in 1930 Dean J. B. Johnston was claiming that "one of the functions of the freshman and sophomore years is to bring to a graceful end the habit of going to school on the part of those who can learn lessons fairly well and can never do anything more." His notion that a democratic college should provide for "graceful failure" contributed to the planning of a General College, which opened in 1932 for lower-quality or unmotivated students judged unlikely to complete a full four-year program. The first year, over a thousand students of doubtful academic potential were enrolled. They were set to work in courses bearing such titles as How to Study, Home Furnishings, Earth and Man, and Foods and Nutrition. No foreign languages were taught, no laboratory courses, no advanced technical specializations. Attesting to the lower-middle-class orientation of the College was the fact that by 1939 fully one-fifth of all students enrolled were listed as the offspring of working-class immigrants. The controlling theme in all respects was one of social adjustment and practical living skills for nontraditional students. Rigorous academic study, by design and intent, had no place in Minnesota's General College.
GREAT BOOKS AND THE CHICAGO PLAN

Surely one of the most remarkable and controversial curricular experiments undertaken by a major university was that launched in 1930 at the University of Chicago under the leadership of Chancellor Robert Maynard Hutchins. Running counter to all prevailing trends, his was a bold initiative aimed at nothing less than a revival of the “classical” liberal-arts tradition. Accompanying faculty approval for the creation of an autonomous undergraduate college unit was its endorsement of a new required curriculum. It was intended to avoid the atomization of an elective system while at the same time promoting general learning on a scale impossible to attain through survey courses alone. The course of study was built up around the reading and discussion of original sources, the so-called “Great Books” of Western civilization. Henceforth, it was announced, general education at Chicago would mean the study “of the greatest books of the Western world and the arts of reading, writing, thinking, and speaking, together with mathematics.” The hope expressed was that a curriculum had been framed that would address all of the elements of humanity’s common nature.

The course of study prescribed was both uniform and demanding. It assumed the form of a series of one-year tightly packed, interdisciplinary survey courses taught through lectures and supplemented by frequent small-group discussions. Course credits and tests were dispensed with altogether. Course attendance was voluntary, though students were required to prepare themselves for comprehensive examinations in English composition, humanities, social sciences, and the physical and biological sciences. Minimal proficiency in a foreign language also was required. Overall, the curriculum purported to include all subject matter indispensable to every educated person, regardless of his or her eventual calling or future professional specialization. Applicants could submit themselves for testing whenever they felt prepared. Only when all examinations had been passed successfully were students permitted to extend their studies at an upper-divisional level or in another college of the University. Under Hutchins’s energetic leadership, the so-called Chicago Plan became the most talked-about innovation in American higher education yet undertaken in the twentieth century.

In a series of essays, articles, and books, Hutchins spelled out the educational philosophy inspiring what he was attempting to accomplish at Chicago. Most widely read among his many works was a collection of manifesto-like addresses delivered at the Storr Lectures at Yale and published in 1936 as *The Higher Learning in America.* There he gave trenchant expression to a point of view aptly characterized much later on by historian Frederick Rudolph (*The American College and University, 1962*) as “a kind of strange and wonderful throwback to Jeremiah Day and the Yale Report of 1828.”

Looking out over the rest of American higher education, Hutchins professed to find only rampant confusion, capitulation to materialism and consumerism, and craven institutions distinguished chiefly for their unabashed vocationalism and unprincipled opportunism. “Love of money,” he alleged, had had the practical effect of creating a “service-station” university. Scrambling to be all things to all people, he claimed, the typical university had bent its energies to flattering the spirit of the age and accommodating to popular demands of the basest sort. He excoriated the university’s tendency to attempt to frame responses to each and every exigency in the name of social utility. In its headlong rush to meet miscellaneous, immediate low-level needs of every sort and kind, Hutchins judged, curricula had proliferated mindlessly. Worse yet, the university had shown itself willing to offer instruction to practically any clientele whatsoever. Once begun, the process of social accommodation promised to continue with no end in sight. More and more, the service-station university was framing its policies to suit those who paid the bills—students, private donors, and state legislatures. The typical academic institution, Hutchins insisted, was neither free nor independent, for it was always obliged to pursue money to support its multitudinous tasks.

Confusion over the meaning of democracy, Hutchins went on to say, had given rise to the mistaken notion that everyone was entitled to the same amount of education. In fact, he argued, the democratic imperative, rightly understood, mandated only that everyone be extended an opportunity to profit from higher learning. Higher education should be elitist, in the meritocratic sense of being reserved exclusively for those best able to profit from it, for those of sufficient interest and ability to be capable of sustaining serious intellectual endeavor. As for the peculiar American passion for credentials, the factor mainly responsible for so many students flocking to campuses, Hutchins felt it might be alleviated by conferring a baccalaureate degree upon every citizen at birth. Only then would colleges and universities be left free to educate those few people genuinely interested in learning.

Contemporary society, Hutchins felt, was confused in its assumption that education should serve a vocational purpose. The true aim of the university, he argued at some length, should be the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake. “Every group in the community that is well enough organized to have an audible voice wants the university to spare it the necessity of training its own recruits,” he observed. “They want to get from the university a product as nearly finished as possible.” The problem as he saw it was that universities had freely acceded to that pressure. The consequence, he announced prophetically,
would be that soon everyone would be clamoring for admission to academe “for the purpose of being trained for something.”

Hutchins conceded the need for job training. Nevertheless, he felt the university was a poor place to attempt direct instruction for employment. “Turning professional schools into vocational schools degrades the universities and does not elevate the professions,” he insisted. The inherent ambiguity in any training program is how to secure immediate technical proficiency, and at the same time some larger understanding of general principles underlying a craft or profession. As he put it, “My contention is that the tricks of the trade cannot be learned in a university, and that if they can be they should not be. They cannot be learned in a university because they get out of date and new tricks take their place, because the teachers get out of date and cannot keep up with current tricks, and because tricks can be learned only in the actual situation in which they can be employed.” What the university should concentrate on, as Hutchins saw it, was promoting the broad understanding that constitutes the basis or foundation for specific skills and places their application in some intelligible context.

Hutchins's decidedly unfashionable prescription was for a forthright return to “a common intellectual training.” Without it, he asserted, a university would remain a series of disparate academic units lacking any common understanding, language, or shared sense of purpose. More specifically, what was needed, in his view, was a “common stock of fundamental ideas” to overcome the “disunity, discord, and disorder” he believed had overtaken the educational system. In apparent defiance of a hundred years of experience, he asserted: “Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. Knowledge is truth. The truth is everywhere the same. Hence education should be everywhere the same.” Education rightly understood should therefore address “the cultivation of the intellect” and devote itself to the single-minded pursuit of intellectual virtues: “The heart of any course of study designed for the whole people will be... the same at any time, in any place, under any political, social, or economic conditions.”

For Hutchins, as for Mortimer Adler, Mark Van Doren, Jacques Barzun, Irving Babbitt, Gilbert Highet, and many others, the “permanent studies” that best reflected a common human nature were those furnished through the Great Books—those works which through the centuries had attained the status of “classics” in all major fields of knowledge. A truly great book, Hutchins explained, is one that has survived the test of time, that is always contemporary and not merely of antiquarian interest, for its fundamental appeal is timeless and independent of any particular set of economic, social, or political circumstances. It endures long after lesser works have been forgotten. A great book is readable by almost everyone. It speaks to universal themes that always occupy thinking persons. Most important, a great book, as Hutchins described it, is one capable of helping to develop standards of taste and criticism conducive to rational thought and reflective action.

Hutchins did not foresee any great inclination on the part of the American public to embrace his ideas. Quite the contrary, he felt they would be exceedingly unpopular though no less valid. A quarter century later, long after he had departed from the University of Chicago, his views remained unchanged. In the preface to a later reissue of his Higher Learning, he saw the same tendencies at work he had warned against in 1936. “One of the easiest things in the world,” he remarked acidly, “is to assemble a list of hilarious courses offered in the colleges and universities of the United States. Such courses reflect the total lack of coherent, rational purpose in these institutions.” In his judgment, if institutions of higher learning had ever given the nation intellectual leadership, any claim of their continuing to do so had long since lost credibility. Educational standards had collapsed entirely. The triumph of specialization, vocationalism and triviality, as he assessed the situation, was well-nigh complete.

At least some of the elements of the Chicago Plan were replicated in experimental colleges and the honors programs of other institutions throughout the country in the late 1930s. The creation of Monticello College at Wayne State University, for example, was one of the first of several attempts to adapt Hutchins's ideas. Better known was the program built up by Stringfellow Burr and Scott Buchanan at St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland, and later at a sister campus in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Critics assailed all such initiatives as undemocratic, outmoded, and utterly out of touch with modern needs. Defenders, for their part, continued to assert the worth and utility of an education based on a fixed system of sources. Although approaches to general learning and liberal culture organized around Great Books would always represent a minor motif in American higher education, they too found a place within the array of curricular experiments undertaken by colleges and universities.

**TWO-YEAR COLLEGES**

Early in the century, echoing an often-repeated assertion, David Starr Jordan in 1903 predicted that "as time goes on the college will disappear, in fact, if not in name. The best will become universities, the others will return to their place as academies." One of several factors seeming to confirm Jordan’s judgment was the frequency with which many collegiate institutions were striving to turn themselves into universities by expanding their graduate courses of instruction. For a time it appeared that any college that did not aspire to
Meanwhile, pressed in the name of democratic opportunity to relax admission requirements and to accept students in ever increasing numbers, by the early 1920s some public institutions were beginning to experience severe problems of overcrowding. Professor Norman Foerster of North Carolina spoke for many in protesting what he felt was the resultant decline in academic standards. "If higher education is to deserve the name," he wrote, "it cannot be brought within the reach of the ineducable and the passively educable." Similarly, a call to allow any high school graduate admission to the state university was dismissed by one professor at Ohio State as "arant sentimentality." Gradually the lines of disagreement hardened. On one side were those who supported the impulse toward almost unlimited growth, even if it meant a certain compromising of academic standards. On the other were those who felt a need to preserve some greater measure of elitism and academic excellence in public higher education, even if it meant turning students away.

An alternative to four-year public education came with the emergence of the so-called junior college. In 1918 there already were 85 such institutions in existence, with a combined enrollment of 4,500 students, representing slightly less than 2 percent of all undergraduates. Of the 85, located in nineteen different states, well over half were concentrated in the five states of California, Missouri, Virginia, Texas, and Illinois. (There were none located east of Michigan or north of Kentucky and North Carolina.) By the mid-1920s their number had increased to 196, with a tenfold increase in enrollment. By 1938, junior-college enrollments had tripled again, accounting for an even larger share of the 18 percent of all college students enrolled nationwide. Catering to the needs of lower-class students who lacked the means or desire to embark upon a four-year curriculum directly from high school, or to those who sought relatively inexpensive instruction within commuting distance, public two-year institutions had obviously found their own special niche within American higher education. Without them, American higher education could scarcely have accommodated the phenomenal increase in college enrollments registered between 1920 and 1940.

Initially, many two-year schools saw themselves preeminently as "feeders" to the more academically demanding and more prestigious four-year colleges and universities. The junior college curriculum, under this view, simply represented the first half of the total course of study students completed before transferring to a four-year institution to complete the bachelor's degree. Many continued long afterwards to view the junior college as a preparatory step to university life and a professional career. That perception was not lost upon leaders of liberal-arts colleges, some of whom professed to find in the
two-year newcomers a substantial threat to the existence of their own four-year institutions. But by the late 1920s and early 1930s the trend was for public junior colleges to begin thinking of themselves more as terminal institutions where students of limited means (and allegedly more limited abilities or aspirations) might prepare themselves for the skilled trades and semiprofessions. President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard professed satisfaction with the proliferation of two-year schools because, as he admitted quite frankly, "One of the merits of these new institutions will be [the] keeping out of college, rather than leading into it, [of] young people who have no taste for higher education." Lauded as instruments of social utility and efficiency, praised for giving concrete expression to the democratic impulse to offer learning for everyone, junior colleges continued to flourish throughout the Depression years, even when larger public universities languished for lack of adequate funding from state legislatures.

With the wisdom of historical hindsight, it is easier to see the somewhat ambiguous and paradoxical role two-year institutions came to play in higher education. Their contribution was to satisfy the precept that in a democracy everyone is entitled to access to higher education. Two-year schools were perceived to be useful not only because they contributed to the diffusion of higher learning within society, but also because they promised to satisfy the needs of those of lesser means and ability. Insofar as the door was left open for deserving two-year graduates to move onward into a four-year institution, junior colleges gave the appearance of enhancing rather than limiting social mobility. To the extent they became terminal institutions, they helped satisfy the equally important need to educate a trained work force, while simultaneously leaving to four-year institutions the opportunity to supply credentials for tomorrow’s professionals and leaders in society.

FROM NORMAL SCHOOLS TO STATE TEACHERS’ COLLEGES

In 1890, there were approximately 135 public normal schools of varying types and sizes still in existence. Their combined student enrollment stood at 27,000, representing only a fraction of the total number of students preparing to become teachers. Additionally, there existed 40 or so private normal schools, the majority of which were strictly regional or local institutions that specialized in providing some type of general education beyond the eighth grade. Ten years later, the total number of normal schools had shrunk to 127 (although a few of them had grown larger and their combined student enrollments had risen to a total of 47,000). By 1920, the number had fallen to sixty-nine; and by 1933 there were no more than 50 public normal institutions still flourishing. The trend in the early 1930s if not before was unmistakable: Single-purpose normal schools of the traditional sort were fast disappearing.

Few mourned their impending demise. Public or private normal schools had long suffered a reputation for inferior academic quality and lax standards. In the opening decades of the twentieth century, it was widely acknowledged that admission standards had remained low despite repeated overtures to make them more stringent. In 1895, for example, only 14 percent of a sample of 51 normal schools required a high-school diploma. By 1905, ten years later, the percentage had increased to no more than 22 percent. In 1908, the Department of Normal Schools of the National Education Association passed a resolution in favor of requiring a high-school diploma for admission to normal schools. Not until the 1930s was it required by the majority of the few schools then remaining.

Meanwhile, criticism of normal schools for reasons unrelated to entrance standards had been mounting steadily since the 1880s. It reached a crescendo of sorts just after the turn of the century, when practically no one—or so it seemed—had good things to say about them. More and more they were seen as anachronisms, as a vestigial atavism of the past, steeped in outmoded lore and no longer well connected with present needs. Through no fault of their own, it was suggested, normal schools had never fully succeeded in providing a reliable supply of high-quality classroom teachers for the nation’s public elementary schools. Still less had it proven possible to enlist them for training high-school teachers. Perhaps now they had outlived their usefulness altogether.

Whatever the reasons for the negative perception of normal schools, something had to be done. Indicative of the direction events were moving, in 1908 the Department of Normal Schools of the National Education Association drew up a policy statement recommending that “Good as the word ‘normal’ is, it should be dropped from the name of these schools and they should be called Teachers [sic] Colleges.” Scarcely appreciated at the time was that in most cases something more than a simple name change would be needed to turn these schools into authentic collegiate institutions.

Sorting out the details as to which normal schools went out of business and which successfully transformed themselves into four-year colleges is no easy task. Some private normal schools simply sank into oblivion, their passing unnoticed and un lamented. Here and there, a few public normals likewise folded quietly for lack of support. More often, however, the betternormal schools were able to manage the transition, undergoing metamorphosis into full-fledged state teachers’ colleges or universities. (In still other cases, state normal colleges were built from the ground up, having no lineage tracing back to some antecedent institution.)
Especially influential in the field of teacher preparation in the last years of the 1800s and into the early twentieth century was a small group of institutions founded prior to 1900 as normal colleges or universities. Unlike former normal secondary schools now engaged in turning themselves into four-year collegiate institutions, the former were ostensibly postsecondary institutions from their very inception. Sometimes they afforded the model or example to which newer colleges looked for guidance in their own development. The former included Kansas State Normal in Emporia (founded in 1865), Southern Illinois State Normal University at Carbondale (founded in 1873), Iowa State Normal (founded in 1876), and the Illinois State Normal University. Among them, Michigan State Normal at Ypsilanti was actually the first (1897) authorized to operate as a public, state-supported teachers’ college. It conferred its first bachelor’s degree in 1905.

By the 1920s, public teachers’ colleges were common throughout the country, and their numbers were growing yearly. Quite unlike the normal schools from which so many were descended, all required a high-school diploma for admission. Each had at least one four-year course sequence in place leading to a bachelor’s degree (typically in secondary education). And almost from their inception, as if seeking to reinforce their identity as true collegiate institutions, the tendency of most teachers’ colleges was to diversify their academic curricula and to become as much as possible like liberal arts colleges. Adding on liberal arts faculty members was essential, both to support teacher preparation and to allow colleges to build up programs in other fields and disciplines.144

The further evolution of four-year normal institutions and teachers’ colleges into multipurpose regional state colleges and universities of a more general character was essentially a post-World War II phenomenon.145 The arrival on campuses in the late 1940s of hundreds of thousands of returning veterans, for example, had a powerful impact, mainly because many so-called nontraditional students were entering college with no intention of readying themselves for teaching. In a replay somewhat reminiscent of the predicament in which nineteenth-century normal schools had found themselves, colleges whose long-standing focus had been on preparing teachers were compelled now to shift resources to support programs and courses of study having nothing whatever to do with teacher training. Within a remarkably brief period of time, the appellation “teachers’ college” no longer adequately reflected the broadened mission and interests of regional state institutions.

Subsequent expansion in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when postwar “baby boomers” hit campuses and enrollments skyrocketed, served mainly to accentuate and further expand the multipurpose nature of most of the nation’s state colleges. Ironically, in their scramble to take on the accouterments of research and scholarship associated with more prestigious universities, the faculties of schools and colleges of education within regional state institutions themselves typically did not oppose suggestions to delete references to “teachers” in the names of their respective institutions. Quite the contrary, some vigorously championed the change, particularly when it was coupled with a proposal to elevate the “college” more or less by legislative fiat and have it declared a “university.” Teacher educators were joined by the rest of their faculty colleagues who had no direct investment in teacher education, who preferred not to be associated with it, and who welcomed whatever terminological change might serve to detach their institution’s identity from its origins as a teachers’ college. The progression was much the same in practically every state: from “normal college” or “teachers’ college” to “state college” to “state university.”

TEACHER PREPARATION IN THE UNIVERSITY

The establishment of free-standing education “schools” or “colleges” as constituent academic components within universities proved to be a rather lengthy process as well, one extending from the late nineteenth century and continuing past the midpoint of the century following. The process was also a noisy one, it might be observed, accompanied as it often was by acrimony and vigorous debate. Shortly after the opening of the twentieth century, for example, A. Ross Hill, dean of a recently-founded Teachers College at the University of Missouri, speaking before an audience at the annual meeting of the National Education Association, advanced what was still held in some quarters to be a very bold idea: that the preparatory normal department, traditionally the poor stepchildren of academe, should be made fully coordinate with colleges of law, engineering, and medicine. “Courses in the philosophy of education, the history of education, and in genetic and educational psychology,” he insisted, “have the same right to place in a scheme of liberal education that have general philosophy, ethics, sociology, and other subjects. Classes in “the theory and practice of teaching, in school management and the like,” Hill declared, should be placed on the same level as “technical courses in law, engineering, or medicine.”146

The question Hill was raising in 1905 essentially was whether normal preparatory departments should be abolished—as some still argued for vociferously—or whether, as he strongly recommended, they should be elevated instead to full status as schools or colleges within universities. As it turned out, within a relatively short time those who shared Hill’s views had won the day. The University of Texas already had a Teachers’ College, one resembling that
opened previously at the University of Missouri. So too did Columbia University and University of Chicago, Minnesota was in the process of establishing its first College of Education in the same year Hill delivered his address.

In 1906, at least 9 universities had education colleges. In 18 or so others, education was already organized as a department more or less coordinate with other academic departments. At Ohio State a College of Education was formed in 1907. That same year the State University of Iowa founded its own School of Education (placed at first within the College of Liberal Arts). Similarly, at the University of Michigan teacher preparation remained a department within the College of Literature, Science and the Arts until 1921, when a separate School of Education was created.147

In 1890, teacher preparation courses were being offered in approximately 114 colleges and universities out of a total of just over 400 institutions (including a number of normal schools). In 1897, the number of schools offering courses in pedagogy had jumped to 220, including those sponsored by separate secondary-level preparatory departments. In 1900, three years later, at least a dozen or so normal departments had been converted into regular academic units within four-year institutions.148 Their numbers included Johns Hopkins, Stanford, Clark, New York University, Harvard, and the University of Pennsylvania, among others. Less than five years after Hill’s address, there were 156 full-scale teacher preparation programs to be found in American higher education. By 1932, toward the end of the first third of the century, almost 600 institutions of higher learning were offering teacher preparatory courses of study.149 In 1948, a total of 196 of these institutions offered fully accredited or officially-approved programs of teacher training. By 1950, the total number of schools with preparatory programs had gone up to 1,200; and in the last third of the century, the total would climb to almost 1,400.

Making teacher education an integral feature of the academic landscape of higher education was no small accomplishment. Yet even from the outset there were those who argued that schools of education should be positioned not at the undergraduate but at the graduate level, similar to colleges of law or medicine, where courses of study were open only to those who had already completed a bachelor’s degree.150 Among those persuaded that professional education should be offered primarily or even exclusively at the post baccalaureate level were such luminaries of the day as Elwood P. Cubberley, William H. Burnham, Frederick E. Bolton, Charles F. Thwint, and Frank McMurtry.

Education units at Harvard, Columbia, and California at Los Angeles had the best chance of transforming themselves into graduate schools of education. Pre-service preparation of elementary and secondary teachers would retain its importance in some of these and in most other leading universities. But the main interest of their faculties had ascended rather quickly to graduate education, with the emphasis placed on advanced training for ranking administrators, curriculum specialists, and other upper-echelon leaders and school managers. Many of the larger state institutions soon followed suit, building up consultancies, instituting research and development centers, expanding graduate degree programs, and in countless other ways distancing themselves as much as possible from the less prestigious work of educating prospective classroom teachers at the undergraduate level.151

Speculation about the motives of those early in the twentieth century who pressed hardest for graduate-level professional education must remain just that—a matter of conjecture. Unquestionably, some did believe strongly and sincerely that the preparation of educational leaders needed to proceed from a foundation built on undergraduate education. By the same token, it would be naive to assume that issues of prestige and status had nothing whatever to do with the positions they took and fought for so vigorously. Undergraduate pre-service teacher training involving large numbers of students was destined to remain an important enterprise at most schools—it was a “cash cow” generating far too much in the way of tuition revenues to be dispensed with entirely. But in the meantime efforts would continue throughout the century to elevate education to the standing of a discipline resembling law or medicine, a field most appropriately pursued at the post-bachelor’s level.

The first step was to argue that school administrators and other leaders needed advanced training at the post-baccalaureate level. Then, second, the argument was expanded to advance the notion that all prospective classroom teachers should receive their training at the graduate level. The former won acceptance in teacher training circles rather quickly. The latter was slower to win support, although well before the end of the century the case for “extended” programs was attracting vigorous support from many educationists in larger universities. Nevertheless, in order to lend academic or intellectual credibility to either proposal, an age-old challenge remained: that of pressing the case for professional education as a legitimate field of inquiry and instruction.

THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY

Many remained unconvinced that the argument for education as a professional field of study could be advanced successfully. The question hotly debated in some quarters, accordingly, was whether trying to take in pedagogical training was not “liable to infringe upon and diminish” the true work of a college or university.152 Academic traditionalists for the most part remained unpersuaded
that pedagogy, a subject formerly taught only at the secondary level, would ever deserve to be elevated to the status demanded of a true college discipline. The feeling was that not only did Education lack any coherent or well-defined body of content, it was unlikely to acquire one any time soon. Attempting to transform it by mere administrative fiat into a legitimate subject of scholarly inquiry and formal instruction at the university level, they alleged, was both quixotic and something of an imposition. President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard had given voice to the sentiments of many skeptics who were inclined to look with ill-concealed derision and scorn on newly-established chairs of pedagogy and education departments. “The faculty, I feel,” he commented, “has but slight interest or confidence in what is ordinarily called pedagogy.”

If college faculties steeped in the liberal arts tradition were dubious over prospects for making pedagogy a bona fide discipline, they harbored even greater reservations about the academic abilities and qualifications—or rather, the seeming lack thereof—of those recruited to accomplish the task. The truth of the matter was, scholars experienced in organizing genuine college-level courses of pedagogical study simply did not yet exist. The trend that aroused the most criticism was assigning responsibility for the development of preparatory programs to faculty members who were ill-equipped to meet the challenge. A typical complaint about the cavalier way appointments were being handled came in 1903 from one professor who observed, “In some cases it seems that the call has been the result of an effort to find a place for a man who is thought to be able to do less harm in a department of education than elsewhere.”

Lacking qualified professors, universities sometimes turned to former public school officials—to school superintendents, principals, and normal-school functionaries—to help build up academic teacher-training programs. In some cases at least, the outcome was reasonably successful, judged by prevailing standards of the day. More often the results were nothing short of disastrous, consisting of courses treating the minutiae of classroom practice in the most mechanical fashion imaginable. Lacking much in the way of intellectual content or substance, most differed but little from offerings commonly found in lower-level normal schools.

Explaining why so many prospective teachers sought to avoid the courses being devised, one professor conceded frankly it was because “the pedagogical work is so namby-pamby and stupid that an active brain gets too weary to stand it.” Partly for this reason, more acceptable by far was the practice of combining academic appointments—that is, of commandeering someone already holding an accredited position as a philosopher, rhetorician, sociologist, historian, or psychologist, and appointing him to a post as professor of pedagogical didactics. He would then be given a mandate to offer one or two special courses expressly for teacher candidates. Among the early pioneers whose interests turned to pedagogy and held joint appointments were William James and G. Stanley Hall, Edward L. Thorndike, John Dewey, Albion Small, Thorstein Veblen, and Herbert Baxter Adams, among others.

Pedagogy as a college-level subject of instruction, it must be said, tended to be quite abstract and theoretical in character when academics from the traditional disciplines were placed in charge. Not much was made at first of the now-familiar distinction between general education and separate specialized “professional” training for teachers. Opinion held, rather, that if there was to be teacher training at all, subject matter of special relevance and interest to teachers should be incorporated with only some slight shift in emphasis or focus as an element within a solid liberal-arts education.

The notion that professional teacher education had virtually no separate identity apart from liberal learning prevailed, of course, at a time when pedagogical studies were still in their embryonic form and were as yet poorly defined. Very little in the way of a separate or systematic body of knowledge, in other words, had yet grown up around teaching as an activity. Inevitably, it was to the established humanities and fledgling social science disciplines that most teacher educators looked for inspiration and guidance. The aim essentially was to draw on established academic subject fields for whatever relevant insights they might afford relative to the work of the lower classroom. Certainly at first, in the search for a substantive content for pedagogical studies, no better alternatives suggested themselves.

Philosophy, law, psychology, political economy, and sociology were the undergirding studies most commonly called upon. The expectation or hope was they might contribute, for example, to a better understanding of schools as social institutions, of learning in its cultural contexts, the nature of instructional goals, formative processes of child development, ethical considerations in instruction, and so on. The result was the emergence of such disciplinary hybrids as history of education, philosophy of education, sociology of education, comparative education, and educational psychology—specialized studies derived from their respective parent disciplines—which were then deployed to furnish the staples of the early teacher preparation curriculum. What prospective teachers needed to acquire, it was assumed, was a sense for the critical and interpretive context of teaching and learning, a broad intellectual perspective on their future work.

Only later on did the notion of pedagogy as teknikós—as almost exclusively a matter of acquiring and applying specific instructional techniques—begin to win acceptance in higher education. In the twentieth century it eventually
came to exercise a controlling influence in teacher-training circles, assuming for a time something akin to the status of unquestioned dogma. Needless to add, as specialized methods courses began to crowd in and dominate the preparatory curriculum, older "foundational" studies in education—educational psychology being the sole exception—tended to lose their central role within preparatory curricula. Increasingly, instead, the trend was to assign them a purely "ceremonial" role or to consign them more and more to the periphery of teacher education. The fact that history and philosophy of education courses acquired a certain notoriety for being poorly taught and irrelevant to the practical concerns of classroom practitioners probably only hastened the process.

As it turned out, looking to former classroom teachers, school administrators, and normal officials as well as university scholars to build up an education faculty tended to produce what can only be characterized as highly eclectic curricula. A typical course of studies, such as that offered at Michigan in 1889–90, included four hours of mandatory course work in the first semester, including lectures on "the art of teaching and governing," instruction in methods of instruction and general classroom practice, school hygiene, and school law. In the second academic term, students enrolled for three hours of courses devoted to the history of ancient and medieval education, school supervision, general school management, and "the art of grading and arranging courses of study." Subsequent terms were given over to a study of "the theoretical and critical principles underlying the art of teaching and governing," the historical development of modern education, comparative study of educational systems, and seminars ("seminaries") on special topics in the history and philosophy of education.154

Even within larger institutions, it was not until well into the twentieth century that colleges and universities went much beyond the appointment of a mere handful of individuals to handle all responsibilities pertaining to teacher training. Charles DeGarmo, writing in 1892, deplored the fact that a genuine institutional commitment to the preparation of teachers for the lower schools was so frequently lacking. "Our chairs of pedagogy in American universities," he alleged, "are fatally defective, in that they are component but not organic units of university life. They are mechanically but not organically connected with their own allied subjects. . . . The professor of pedagogy is neatly glued on the university as a whole, but he has no group of men with whom he can organize an education department."155

On the other side, even when full departments or schools of education were assembled, doubts persisted across campus about their academic rigor and integrity, doubts that extended to the scholarly abilities of those recruited to staff them. A decidedly uncomplimentary portrait of the education professor dating from the early 1900s foreshadowed unkind epithets heard frequently throughout the rest of the century. The erstwhile expert in pedagogics, it was remarked, was "gentle, unintellectual, saccharine, and well-meaning . . . a humbling doctor of undiagnosable ills, harmless if morosely defensive," someone apt to be "either a mechanic" or a "flatulent promoter of irrelevant trivia."156 Nothing else perhaps so vividly illustrates how schoolmen-turned-professors at the turn of the century had failed to win the confidence of their academic peers and colleagues. Nor, more fundamentally, had the teacher preparation over which they presided yet gained acceptance as a sound and legitimate academic undertaking. (The aspiration to make it so, it could be argued a full century later, has still to be realized.)

All the while, the problem of how best to mount baccalaureate teaching-training programs loomed large. By the end of the nineteenth century, most of the basic organizational or structural issues had already surfaced and were fast becoming subjects of lively debate. Much depended on how the work of teacher preparation was conceived. Was teacher training something to be grafted onto liberal learning? Could the former somehow be infused or integrated within the latter? Or were the two indistinguishable from one another?

Unresolved questions abounded. Was it appropriate, it was asked, to introduce professional and methodological courses to teacher candidates while they were still in the midst of pursuing their own general academic studies, possibly even in their first or second year of college? Within a four-year program of studies, what sort of balance should be struck between the professional or technical components of a future teacher's preparation and the liberal elements of the student's undergraduate education? Could the two be intertwined somehow, or run parallel to one another? Or ought they to be sequenced apart, in entirely separate courses? Finally, who should decide all such issues—should responsibility for teacher training be assigned exclusively to an education faculty, or should it be an undertaking shared by the institution as a whole? If the latter, what would be required to enlist the cooperation and support needed from professors in the various liberal arts and sciences?

Other questions followed. Should future secondary teachers be required to have an academic "major" or field of concentration based on the subjects they intended to teach eventually? And should the teaching of pedagogical courses be delayed until late in a baccalaureate degree program? Or was it preferable to postpone specialized teacher training until even later, after candidates had completed their bachelor's degrees? Again, were the preparatory needs of elementary teachers significantly different from those of prospective
high-school teachers? When should practice teaching occur? Did student teaching need to be preceded by guided observation and prior internship experiences in elementary or secondary classrooms? These and other considerations continued to challenge teacher educators throughout the course of the twentieth century—and it might be said that in a very real sense ever since they have never admitted of any authoritative resolution or consensus.

Overshadowing all other issues late in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth was the still-unresolved question of the intellectual and academic legitimacy of teacher education itself as a professional enterprise. Was there in fact an accredited and reliable body of knowledge underlying preparatory programs, regardless of how they were organized? Or at least were there grounds for believing that a body of knowledge capable of providing their intellectual and empirical underpinnings was in process of development? Had the study of “education” begun to construct its own unique conceptual apparatus, an organizing framework of ideas, its own modes of inquiry and investigation? Or was pedagogy inherently derivative from other more basic disciplines, possessing no special identity of its own?

The tendency among early nineteenth-century educators had been always to assume or flatly assert that a true “science” of education already existed. Alternatively, confidence was expressed that an authentic discipline could be expected to emerge within the near future. As James Carter had told the American Institute of Instruction back in 1830, although it was true to say of pedagogy that it was still in its infancy as a field of inquiry, further progress in its development as a valid science was destined to advance “with a motion as steady and irresistible as that of the spheres.”

Lending support to the theme, Richard Edwards weighed in with much the same judgment years later. Speaking before a meeting of the National Education Association in 1865, he responded to critics, observing “It has been sometimes intimated that this pretended science of education is a myth—that the talk of it is of little account. It has been charged, perhaps not altogether generously, that its advocates and professors are more enthusiastic than wise—that they are either intentional deceivers of the public, or unwitting deceivers of themselves—that, in short, the whole matter is a sort of well-intentioned imposture.”

Edwards expressed confidence that the basic principles of teaching were already known and that, much as was happening in the field of medicine, their implications and applications would be further drawn out and added to over time. “There is here,” he avowed, “as noble a science as ever engaged the thought of men. There are immutable principles here that ought to be studied and comprehended by every young person entering on the work of teaching. There is, in the nature of things, a foundation for a profession of teaching.”

By the end of the century, with so little seeming progress registered, growing skepticism about the alleged inevitability of a discipline of education emerging might have been understandable. The task of making a case for a true “science” of education by now had acquired a certain intellectual urgency about it; and with so few solid advances in evidence, the attempt to carry it forward tended to place proponents on the defensive. Showing that preparatory programs for classroom teachers rested on a solid foundation of knowledge, that they could be made more academically defensible, was a challenge that would occupy the attention and energy of teacher educators for decades to come—indeed, the whole of the twentieth century and beyond.
Chapter 6


2. To speak of an “overall climate” is something of an historiographical fiction, but the general theme is amplified to good advantage in Lawrence A. Vesey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 332ff.


4. Quoted in Vesey, p. 344.

5. J. R. Wheeler, “The Idea of a College and of a University,” Columbia University Quarterly 10 (December 1907): 12. This somewhat disingenuous argument, now hailed by much reiteration, is now advanced oftentimes virtually unchanged in similar contemporary pronouncements.


69. An interesting analysis of undergraduate college students in the early 1900s is given in Vesey, pp. 268–263.
77. Ross, Democracy's College, p. 151.
88. See Brubacher and Rudy, pp. 330–344.
105. Ibid., p. 277.
106. Wechsler, p. 396.
110. Note, for example, Frederick P. Kappel's review of Eliot's University Administration, in Educational Review 37 (January 1909): 94.
12. This essentially was the position defended by Hook in Heresy—Yes; Conspiracy—No!


20. Snyder, passim; and Anderson, pp. 7-8.

21. Snyder, passim; and Anderson, pp. 6, 9.


26. For a cogent analysis of the framing of several major federal policy initiatives affecting higher education in the postwar era, see Janet C. Kerr, "From Truman to Johnson: Ad Hoc Policy Formulation in Higher Education," Review of Higher Education 8 (Fall 1984): 15-84.

27. Trow, pp. 15ff.
